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DISCRIMINATION IN ONLINE EMPLOYMENT RECRUITING

PAULINE T. KIM* AND SHARION SCOTT**
ABSTRACT
Employment recruitment is increasingly moving online as employers use
Facebook and other social media platforms to advertise job opportunities. This
shift to online advertising allows employers to more precisely target workers
likely to apply, but also raises concerns about unfair exclusion. This essay
explains the mechanisms through which online recruiting can produce
discriminatory effects and examines the question of when employers will be
liable under existing employment discrimination laws. Both Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act contain littlenoticed provisions that specifically forbid discriminatory advertising, in
addition to their general prohibitions on taking adverse employment actions
because of a protected characteristic. We examine whether or how these
provisions might apply to online targeted advertising and also whether
employers’ recruiting practices might support claims of disparate treatment or
disparate impact discrimination. We conclude that ample room exists within
existing doctrine to address the most egregious practices; however, it is less
certain whether current law is adequate to reach all forms of targeted
recruitment with significant discriminatory effects.

* Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis,
Missouri.
** J.D., Washington University School of Law; Law Clerk to the Honorable Nannette Jolivette
Brown, Eastern District of Louisiana.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Mark Edelstein scrolled through his Facebook newsfeed one day, he
was unaware that there were job postings he was not seeing. He saw ads for
software he could purchase or websites he could use to book travel, but positions
at companies such as HubSpot were not visible to him because they had chosen
to advertise only to certain groups, such as “people ages 27 to 40.” 1 Edelstein,
who was fifty-eight at the time, was not in the audience targeted to receive those
advertisements even though he was searching for employment. 2
As Edelstein’s experience suggests, employer recruiting practices have
undergone a seismic shift. Not too long ago, when employers sought to recruit
new employees, they could advertise the job opening in a newspaper or other
media outlet, distribute flyers, engage an employment agency, attend a job fair,
or simply ask their current employees if they knew of anyone who might be
interested. 3 Some of these methods—particularly word-of-mouth recruitment—
tended to limit the pool of workers who would learn of the opportunity. 4 But the
most commonly used formal methods of recruitment, like newspaper
advertisements, were potentially accessible to all interested persons. Today,
employment recruiting is increasingly moving onto social media platforms like
Facebook. Recent surveys show a clear upward trend in online recruiting. 5 In
2015, an overwhelming majority of employers surveyed—eighty-four percent—

1. Julia Angwin, Noam Scheiber & Ariana Tobin, Dozens of Companies Are Using Facebook
to Exclude Older Workers from Job Ads, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2017, 5:45 PM), https://www.prop
ublica.org/article/facebook-ads-age-discrimination-targeting [https://perma.cc/B356-KYRJ].
2. Id.
3. See F. Carson Mencken & Idee Winfield, Employer Recruiting and the Gender
Composition of Jobs, 32 SOC. FOCUS 201, 202 (1999).
4. Id. at 203–04 (discussing how informal recruiting limits employment opportunities for
certain groups but more formal advertising reaches a wider audience).
5. The Society for Human Resource Management conducts biennial surveys of job recruiters.
The surveys demonstrated an increase in the use of online recruiting by employers, rising from
fifty-six percent in 2011 to seventy-seven percent in 2013 to eighty-four percent in 2015. SHRM
Survey Findings: Social Networking Websites and Recruiting/Selection, SOC. FOR HUM. RESOURCE
MGMT. 2 (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-sur
veys/Pages/shrm-social-networking-websites-recruiting-job-candidates.aspx [https://perma.cc/6E
3B-2D3L]; SHRM Survey Findings: Using Social Media for Talent Acquisition—Recruitment and
Screening, SOC. FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 3 (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/
trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Documents/SHRM-Social-Media-Recruiting-Screen
ing-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/A523-99VX]. See also Jobvite’s New 2015 Recruiter Nation Survey
Reveals Talent Crunch, JOBVITE (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.jobvite.com/news_item/jobvitesnew-2015-recruiter-nation-survey-reveals-talent-crunch-95-recruiters-anticipate-similar-increas
ed-competition-skilled-workers-coming-year-86-expect-exp
[https://perma.cc/72TY-HW3J];
Kimberlee Morrison, Survey: 92% of Recruiters Use Social Media to Find High-Quality
Candidates, ADWEEK, (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.adweek.com/digital/survey-96-of-recruitersuse-social-media-to-find-high-quality-candidates/ [https://perma.cc/8F7E-AH4D].

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2018]

DISCRIMINATION IN ONLINE EMPLOYMENT RECRUITING

95

reported using social media to recruit, 6 and the proportion has likely gone up
since then.
Facebook is not alone in allowing recruiters to target a demographically
restricted audience. The very premise of online advertising is that it can precisely
target viewers based on their interests, preferences, and characteristics. Google,
LinkedIn, and other platforms also encourage advertisers to use personal
attributes to choose who can see their ads, as well as who will be excluded. 7
Employers value these tools because they can deploy their recruiting dollars
strategically, targeting ads to those who are most likely to have relevant skills
and to actually apply.
The shift to online recruiting raises concerns about unfair exclusion. In a
series of articles, ProPublica reported on the potential for advertisers to exclude
certain racial groups from receiving their online ads. 8 Several lawsuits were
subsequently filed alleging that Facebook unlawfully permitted discriminatory
advertising. 9 The issue of whether online platforms should be liable for
facilitating discriminatory conduct is a vexing one, involving questions about
what constitutes discriminatory conduct as well as when the platforms are
entitled to immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. 10
A number of cases and articles have explored these questions in some depth. 11
6. SHRM Survey Findings: Using Social Media for Talent Acquisition—Recruitment and
Screening, supra note 5, at 3.
7. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, AARP and Key Senators Urge Companies to End Age Bias
in Recruiting on Facebook, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/arti
cle/aarp-and-key-senators-urge-companies-to-end-age-bias-in-recruiting-on-facebook [https://per
ma.cc/6ND8-GEGW].
8. Julia Angwin & Terry Parris, Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-letsadvertisers-exclude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/B8YC-LJYM]; Julia Angwin, Facebook Says
it Will Stop Allowing Some Advertisers to Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 11, 2016,
10:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-to-stop-allowing-some-advertisers-to-ex
clude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/E87K-LWJW]; Julia Angwin, Ariana Tobin & Madeleine
Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov.
21, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-advertising-discrimination-hous
ing-race-sex-national-origin [https://perma.cc/84QT-GUGV].
9. Onuoha v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD, 2016 WL 6599689, para. 2 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 9, 2018) (class action lawsuit against Facebook for engaging in a pattern-or-practice of
providing racially discriminatory advertising for employers, creditors, and housing providers, in
violation of multiple civil rights laws); Bradley v. T-Mobile, No. 5:17-cv-07232, 2017 WL
6539268, para. 1–2, 10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2018); Nat’l Fair Housing Alliance v. Facebook, Inc.,
No. 1:18-cv-02689, 2018 WL 1505634, para. 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2018) (fair housing lawsuit
against Facebook for enabling housing advertisers to exclude certain groups on the basis of
protected traits).
10. Communications Decency Act of 1934 § 230, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
11. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008);
Amit Datta, Anupam Datta, Jael Makagon, Deirdre K. Mulligan, Michael Carl Tschantz,
Discrimination in Online Advertising: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING
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This Article examines the distinct but related question of employer liability.
Our focus is thus on the underexplored question of when employers should be
liable for discrimination based on their online recruiting strategies. These
questions were raised in Bradley v. T-Mobile, 12 a lawsuit filed in December
2017, which claims that employers such as T-Mobile, Amazon, Cox
Communications, and Hubspot are using Facebook’s advertising tools in ways
that violate federal and state age discrimination laws. 13 The complaint alleges
that these employers exclude older workers from receiving information about
job opportunities by using advertisements targeted on the basis of age. 14 As
explained below, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 15 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) 16 both contain little-noticed
provisions that specifically forbid discriminatory advertising 17 in addition to
their general prohibitions on taking adverse employment actions because of a
protected characteristic. We consider various theories for holding employers
liable for their advertising and recruitment practices, and conclude that ample
room exists within existing doctrine to address the most egregious practices.
Whether current law is adequate to reach all practices with significant
discriminatory effects is less certain.
We begin in Part II by explaining how employers can recruit candidates
online and why these strategies may sometimes discriminate based on race, sex,
age, or other traits currently protected by law. In Part III, we analyze the sparse
legal authority interpreting the prohibitions on discriminatory advertising in the
context of newspaper advertisements. We also review cases that relied on
discriminatory recruitment practices as evidence of disparate treatment or
disparate impact liability. In Part IV, we apply that authority to online
recruitment practices, considering the extent to which existing law can address
concerns about discriminatory exclusion.

RES. 1, 2 (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/datta18a/datta18a.pdf [https://perma.cc/48YJ-7
C5E]
12. Bradley, 2017 WL 6539268, para. 1–22.
13. Press Release, Commc’n Workers of America, Class Action Lawsuit Hits T-Mobile,
Amazon, Cox and Hundreds of Large Employers for Allegedly Using Facebook to Exclude Millions
of Older Americans from Job Ads in Violation of Age Discrimination Laws (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.cwa-union.org/news/releases/class-action-lawsuit-hits-tmobile-amazon-cox-for-al
leged-age-discrimination [https://perma.cc/GM36-AB8M]. The lawsuit was filed with both a
plaintiff class that includes older workers and a defendant class of hundreds of companies that
utilize targeted advertising.
14. Id.
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 703-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2012).
16. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 §§ 2-12, 14-15, 17, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–
634 (2012).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012).
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II. ONLINE EMPLOYMENT RECRUITING PRACTICES
The power of online recruiting lies in the ability it gives employers to
precisely target specific audiences. By directing their employment ads at the
most plausible and desirable candidates, they can save money and effort. While
targeted advertising enables more efficient outreach, it may also open the door
to the discriminatory delivery of ads. This part explains that risk, focusing
primarily on Facebook to illustrate the mechanics of the ad targeting process.
Like other internet platforms, Facebook systematically collects large
amounts of data about users’ activities on the site, such as who their friends are,
when they “like” something, and what links they click. 18 Facebook also
purchases information from data brokers to learn about users’ offline behavior,
including income and spending habits. 19 All of this data is aggregated and
analyzed to sort and categorize users. Studies estimate that Facebook uses tens
or perhaps hundreds of thousands of unique attributes to classify its users 20—
categories ranging from people who have expressed an interest in cats to expats
who lived in Bangladesh. Facebook uses all this data to help advertisers identify
the specific types of people they want to receive their ads. 21 They can choose to
target or exclude people from their audience using basic demographic variables
like age, gender, or location. 22 They can also select more granular categories—

18. See Hanna Kozlowska, “Why Am I Seeing This Ad” Explanations on Facebook are
Incomplete and Misleading, a Study Says, QUARTZ (Apr. 6, 2018), https://qz.com/1245941/whyam-i-seeing-this-ad-explanations-on-facebook-are-incomplete-and-misleading-a-study-says/
[https://perma.cc/6TGR-EGTQ]; Dylan Curran, Are You Ready? Here Is All the Data Facebook
and Google Have on You, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2018, 3:17 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/28/all-the-data-facebook-google-has-onyou-privacy [https://perma.cc/FFT2-HJMT].
19. See Julia Angwin, Surya Mattu & Terry Parris, Jr., Facebook Doesn’t Tell Users
Everything It Really Knows About Them, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.pro
publica.org/article/facebook-doesnt-tell-users-everything-it-really-knows-about-them [https://per
ma.cc/6WE7-BR2M].
20. Angwin et al., supra note 19 (collecting more than 52,000 unique attributes that Facebook
uses to classify users); Till Speicher et al., Potential for Discrimination in Online Targeted
Advertising, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 7 (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/
speicher18a/speicher18a.pdf [https://perma.cc/LDW5-57UA] (reporting retrieval of nearly
240,000 free-form attributes available on Facebook).
21. See Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 7; Targeting Tips to Reach the Right People,
BUSINESS,
https://www.facebook.com/business/a/facebook-ads-targeting-tips
FACEBOOK
[https://perma.cc/8XGE-BK5Z] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018); Choose Your Audience, FACEBOOK
BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/business/products/ads/ad-targeting [https://perma.cc/VM
K5- 3G58] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018).
22. See Targeting Tips to Reach the Right People, supra note 21.
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for example, targeting an audience that is politically conservative or excluding
from their audience people labeled as interested in red wine or the Civil War. 23
There are at least three ways in which targeted online recruitment may have
discriminatory effects, whether intended or not. First, employers might rely on
a protected characteristic to include or exclude recipients from their targeted
group. For example, they might limit their audience to only women, or to
individuals between the ages of eighteen and forty. 24 Second, employers might
choose their target audience by relying on attributes that appear to be neutral yet
are closely correlated with protected characteristics. 25 For example, in areas with
heavy residential segregation, limiting advertisements to people in certain zip
codes can create a racially skewed applicant pool. Similarly, directing ads at
users labeled with the attributes “Young & Hip” or “Millennial” will likely avoid
older workers, and excluding users interested in “Nuestro Diario” will eliminate
many Hispanics from the target audience. 26
The third way online advertising can have discriminatory effects is through
Facebook’s “lookalike” audience tool. 27 To use this feature, advertisers provide
Facebook with information about an existing group—the source audience—that
it knows to be a relevant audience. In the recruiting context, the source audience
might be an employer’s current workforce. Facebook then uses traits such as
location, age, gender, and interests to find other Facebook users who are similar
to the source audience. 28 If a company’s workforce is already biased along the
lines of age, race, or sex, creating a “lookalike” audience that matches its current
employees’ characteristics will simply perpetuate those biases and exclude
people that belong to different demographic groups.
The first method—defining the target audience using a protected
characteristic—generally involves an intentional choice on the part of the
employer, and Facebook’s platform makes that kind of choice possible.
ProPublica reported in 2016 that it was able to purchase housing ads on
Facebook that excluded users with the attributes of African-American, Asian-

23. See Noam Scheiber, Facebook’s Ad-Targeting Problem, Captured in a Literal Shade of
Gray, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/technology/facebookads.html [https://perma.cc/W5LH-EGYR?type=image].
24. See Angwin et al., supra note 1.
25. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 10.
26. See Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 9; Verne Kopytoff, Tech Industry Job Ads: Older
Workers Need Not Apply, FORTUNE (June 19, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/06/19/tech-job-adsdiscrimination/ [https://perma.cc/XW72-B5WF]. Though these groups do not specifically limit
which ages are included, users who are sorted into them are people who have been labeled as such
or like pages related to the labels; typically, this would attract younger audiences and
disproportionately exclude people over a certain age.
27. About Lookalike Audiences, FACEBOOK BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/business/
help/164749007013531 [https://perma.cc/S935-22UW] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018).
28. Targeting Tips to Reach the Right People, supra note 21.
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American, or Hispanic affinity. 29 Facebook subsequently announced that it
would no longer accept ads for housing, employment, or credit that relied on
ethnic attributes, but a follow-up study showed that targeting such ads on these
bases was still possible. 30 Facebook has apparently not attempted to prohibit the
use of sex or age categories for targeted ads. 31 In the Bradley case, the plaintiffs
were able to document numerous examples of job ads that targeted a restricted
age range, such as T-Mobile’s ad aimed at people eighteen to thirty-eight. 32
The second and third methods could also be used deliberately by an
advertiser to restrict its audience on the basis of race, sex, or other protected
category. In order to investigate this possibility, Speicher et al. tested whether a
“malicious advertiser” could exclude certain groups by leveraging the extensive
personal data available through Facebook. 33 They found, as suggested above,
that many of the attributes collected by Facebook are strongly correlated with
protected traits like race and could be used deliberately to “allow extremely
biased targeting.” 34 Speicher et al. also demonstrated that if an advertiser started
with a highly biased source audience, it could use Facebook’s lookalike audience
feature to “effectively scal[e] the bias to much larger populations.” 35
As Speicher et al. acknowledge, however, discriminatory bias in ad delivery
might occur unintentionally as well. 36 When an advertiser relies on neutral
attributes to select an audience, it may not always be obvious that doing so can
skew the audience along demographic lines. Particularly, when multiple
attributes are combined to define who to target, the interaction between those
attributes may make it difficult to predict the effects that they will have on the
composition of the audience. Similarly, because Facebook’s algorithm
determines what are the salient features of the source audience that will be used
to select the lookalike audience, an employer relying on this tool may not realize
its potential to target audiences which are biased in some way.
Other experimental studies have documented instances of biased delivery of
employment ads, as well as the difficulty in determining the causes of the bias.
Datta et al. ran an experiment in which simulated computer users were identified
as male or female and engaged in identical web browsing activities to signal

29. See Angwin & Parris, Jr., supra note 8.
30. See Angwin, supra note 8.
31. See Valentino-DeVries, supra note 7 (Facebook vice president defended use of age as
valid basis for advertising).
32. Bradley v. T-Mobile, No. 5:17-cv-07232, 2017 WL 6539268, para. 2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1,
2018).
33. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 7–10.
34. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 11.
35. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 11. Speicher et al. also analyzed a third mechanism for
targeting users—the custom audience. Id. at 4–7. We omit discussion of this targeting method
because it is not as relevant to our analysis.
36. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 2.
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their interest in employment. 37 The experimenters found that Google served
different ads relating to employment opportunities to male and female users. For
example, an ad for a career coaching service for high-paying executive positions
was shown far more often to male users. 38 Although the difference in ad delivery
was significant, the authors reported that they could not “determine whether
Google, the advertiser, or complex interactions among them and others caused
the discrimination.” 39 They also acknowledged the possibility that the
discriminatory effects might be entirely unintentional—resulting, for example,
from the operation of algorithms that optimize clicks or other metrics. 40
Regardless of whether the discriminatory effects were inadvertent, they argued
that their findings raise concerns because of their unjust social effects. 41
In another study, Lambrecht and Tucker ran a field test of an ad promoting
STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) careers. 42 Although the
ad was intended to be shown on a gender-neutral basis, they found that twenty
percent more men than women received it. 43 This difference was observed even
though women were more likely to click on the ad if they received it. 44
Lambrecht and Tucker suggest that the gender disparity in delivery of the ad
resulted from spillover effects in the ad ecosystem. More specifically, because
younger women are a prized demographic for other advertisers, it is costlier to
serve ads to them. 45 As a result, algorithms that optimize cost efficiency may
produce a discriminatory pattern of ad delivery that effectively reduces women’s
access to information about career opportunities.
These studies show that online targeting can result in unequal ad delivery.
Determining the causes of the disparities can be difficult, however. Even when
conducting a controlled study, researchers cannot always pinpoint the precise
reasons why biased outcomes are observed. 46 Regardless of the cause, these
methods of targeting ads can end up sorting people such that certain groups are
systematically denied information about available jobs. When this works to
37. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz & Anupam Datta, Automated Experiments on Ad
Privacy Settings, 1 PROC. ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHS. 92, 93 (2015).
38. Id. at 93, 102.
39. Id. at 105.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Anja Lambrecht & Catherine Tucker, Algorithmic Bias? An Empirical Study into Apparent
Gender-Based Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads (Mar. 9, 2018), https://papers.ss
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852260 [https://perma.cc/598J-S2F2].
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 24–25.
46. Without a field experiment or controlled study, it may be difficult to detect biased patterns
in ad delivery. For this reason, auditing the operation of algorithms like online ad delivery systems
is crucial for detecting discrimination. See Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination,
166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189 (2017).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2018]

DISCRIMINATION IN ONLINE EMPLOYMENT RECRUITING

101

exacerbate inequality or disadvantage along the lines of race, sex, or other
protected characteristics, the results are a form of data-driven discrimination
described in earlier work as “classification bias.” 47 Because classification bias
risks deepening existing patterns of inequality, it should be a matter of
significant policy concern. The next part considers the extent to which existing
legal tools can reach this form of bias.
III. DISCRIMINATORY EMPLOYMENT ADS: A LOOK BACK
Before the mid-1960s, employment ads that specified race and gender
requirements for employees were commonplace. 48 Postings typically specified
if a man or woman was wanted for the job, and ads that sought applications only
from whites, or from particular ethnic groups, were common. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 changed all that. In addition to Title VII’s familiar
prohibition on firing or refusing to hire workers because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, the statute includes a provision in Section 704(b) that
makes it unlawful for employers to publish advertisements expressing a
preference based on one of the protected categories. 49 When Congress passed
the ADEA in 1967, it included nearly identical language forbidding employers
from indicating age-based preferences in their job postings. 50
After Title VII became effective, job advertisements expressing racial
preferences quickly disappeared, but the application of Section 704(b) to sexspecific ads was contested. 51 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) initially published guidance that allowed sex-segregated help-wanted
columns so long as the text of the ad itself stated that the position was open to
males and females. 52 As newspapers continued to publish sex-segregated job ads
under the EEOC’s sanction, women’s advocacy groups protested and rallied for
stricter regulations. The National Organization for Women, which formed in
1966 partly in response to the EEOC’s failure to prohibit sex-segregated ads, put

47. Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 890–
92 (2017).
48. Nicholas Pedriana & Amanda Abraham, Now You See Them, Now You Don’t: The Legal
Field and Newspaper Desegregation of Sex-Segregated Help Wanted Ads 1965–75, 31 LAW &
SOCIAL INQUIRY 905, 906 (2006).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012).
51. See Pedriana & Abraham, supra note 48, at 911.
52. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 30 Fed. Reg. 14926–28 (Dec. 2, 1965)
(originally codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604). The EEOC required that sex-segregated ads (1)
“specifically state that the job is open to males and females” and (2) include in that section of the
newspaper a boxed nondiscrimination disclaimer. The disclaimer had to make clear that separate
sex male and female listings “specifically state that the job is open to males and females,” and were
“not intended to exclude or discourage applications for persons of the other sex.”; Pedriana &
Abraham, supra note 48, at 913 (quoting EEOC Press Release from September 22, 1965).
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increased pressure on the EEOC to change its stance. 53 In 1968 the EEOC
revised its guidelines to unequivocally declare that “the placement of job
advertisements under separate male and female column headings violates the
law.” 54
Around the same time, states and local governments passed their own
employment discrimination statutes that created liability for employers who
advertised in sex-segregated columns. 55 Many of these state and local laws also
included “aiding and abetting” provisions holding non-employer entities liable
for participating in discrimination by an employer. 56 Women’s advocacy groups
successfully used these laws to argue that newspapers which published sexsegregated help-wanted ads were unlawfully “aiding and abetting” gender
discrimination. 57
In 1973, the Supreme Court upheld the application of an “aiding and
abetting” clause to a newspaper that published separate male and female
employment columns, 58 and shortly thereafter, major newspapers throughout the
country abandoned the practice. 59 Employers also stopped stating discriminatory
preferences explicitly in their job ads, and as a result, the provisions forbidding
discriminatory ads were largely forgotten in the following decades. Instead,
litigants overwhelmingly focused on challenging adverse employment actions
such as failure to hire or discharge under the disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories of liability. 60
The growth in targeted online ads—and the risks of bias discussed in Part II
above—raises questions of whether and when employers will be liable for the
discriminatory effects of their recruitment practices. In this section, we discuss
how past cases treated employers’ offline recruitment practices under the
discriminatory advertising provisions, as well as under the more familiar

53. Pedriana & Abraham, supra note 48, at 913–14.
54. Id. at 914 (quoting Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Issues
Guidelines on Classified Advert., Rules Separate Male-Female Ads Illegal, (Aug. 6, 1968) (on file
with the EEOC Library)). The American Newspaper Publishing Association filed suit arguing that
EEOC guidelines were not legally binding, but federal courts rejected the argument and held that
EEOC interpretations should be accorded consideration. See Am. Newspaper Pub. Ass’n v.
Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D.D.C 1968). See also Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228 (5th Cir. 1969).
55. Pedriana & Abraham, supra note 48, at 916.
56. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5–12 (West 2018); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney
2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a–60 (West 2017).
57. See, e.g., Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 308 A.2d 649 (N.J. 1973); Nat’l Org. for Women
v. State Div. of Human Rights, 314 N.E.2d 867 (N.Y. 1974); State Div. of Human Rights ex rel
Carey v. Binghamton Press Co., 67 A.D.2d 231 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
58. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391
(1973).
59. Pedriana & Abraham, supra note 48, at 906.
60. See, e.g., Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1983).
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theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact liability. Section A reviews
the law addressing when employers are liable for their discriminatory
advertising. Section B explores cases where employers’ advertising and other
recruiting practices provide evidence to support plaintiffs’ disparate treatment
and disparate impact claims.
A.

Liability for Discriminatory Advertising
Section 704(b) of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to print or
publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement relating
to employment . . . indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or
discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . . 61

The statute makes an exception if the position is one for which religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification, 62 but otherwise the
prohibition seems quite absolute. Section 623(e) of the ADEA contains nearly
identical language prohibiting advertisements expressing age preferences. 63
Liability under these provisions turns on whether an advertisement “indicat[es]
any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination” on a forbidden
basis. 64 These prohibitions clearly forbid a job posting stating that the employer
will only hire workers of a particular race, gender or age, for example, but it is
less certain how they apply when the preferences are not expressed explicitly.
The EEOC has offered only minimal guidance in this area. As mentioned
above, in 1968 it issued guidance stating that it considered the placement of help
wanted ads in sex segregated columns to be “an expression of a preference,
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex.” 65 Thus, even if the
content of an ad was gender neutral, it violated the statute when placed in a
column indicating a preference for hiring males or females. Although the
EEOC’s guidance only addresses sex-segregated job listings, it suggests more

61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012). This prohibition also applies to labor organizations,
employment agencies, or committees that control access to apprenticeships or training programs.
62. Employer notices or advertisements “may indicate a preference, limitation, specification,
or discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin when religion, sex, or national origin is
a bona fide occupational qualification for employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012).
63. The ADEA language states that:
It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or employment agency to print or
publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to
employment by such an employer or membership in or any classification or referral for
employment by such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or referral for
employment by such an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination, based on age.
29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012).
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5 (1968).
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broadly that the context in which an ad appears can provide evidence of a
discriminatory preference even if the text alone does not.
Regarding the analogous provisions in the ADEA, the Department of Labor,
which was initially responsible for the statute’s enforcement, issued an
Interpretive Bulletin declaring that when advertisements “contain terms and
phrases such as ‘age 25 to 35,’ ‘young,’ ‘boy,’ ‘girl,’ or others of a similar nature
which indicate a preference for a particular age, range of ages, or for a young
age group, such a term or phrase . . . is in violation of the Act . . . .”66 The
position of the Department appeared to be that using these terms, even absent an
express intent to discriminate against older workers, was inherently
discriminatory. The EEOC assumed responsibility for enforcing the ADEA in
1979, 67 and it has adopted the same position as its own guidance, reasoning that
the use of such terms “tend[s] to limit or deter the employment of older
workers.” 68
Only a small handful of cases have interpreted the discriminatory
advertising provisions of Title VII and the ADEA, and courts have found that
liability turns on two distinct issues. The first considers when an advertisement
indicates a discriminatory preference. The second concerns who can bring suit
against an employer or other covered entity that publishes such an
advertisement.
Determining when an advertisement is unlawful requires examining not just
the use of specific words within the four corners of the ad, but also the overall
context in which it is published. In one of the earliest published cases, Hailes v.
United Air Lines, the defendant advertised for stewardesses in the “Help
Wanted-Female” column but did not place a similar ad in the “Help WantedMale” column. 69 The plaintiff, a male applicant, saw the ad and sued, alleging
discriminatory advertising. 70 The Fifth Circuit concluded that he had stated a
claim for relief under 704(b), given the language and the context of the ad. 71
Consistent with the EEOC’s guidance, the court found that placing the ad in the
“Help Wanted—Female” column “plainly indicates a preference for females”

66. 29 C.F.R. § 860.92(b) (1968) (effectively rescinded by 46 Fed. Reg. 47724 (Sept 29,
1981), and transferred from the C.F.R. by 52 Fed. Reg. 23812 (June 25, 1987)). This interpretation
was created when the Department of Labor was responsible for enforcing the ADEA. When the
responsibility shifted to the EEOC, the EEOC passed an almost parallel regulation codified as 29
C.F.R. § 1625.
67. Victoria A. Lipnic, The State of Age Discrimination and Older Workers in the U.S. 50
Years After the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N (June 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/adea50th/report.cfm [https://perma.cc/2
V6D-4WKJ].
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1625 (2007).
69. Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1972).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1009.
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and that the inclusion of a statement by the airline that it was an “Equal
Opportunity Employer” could not overcome that conclusion. 72
A case decided under Section 623(e) of the ADEA also focused on context
to determine whether advertisements indicated a preference based on age. In
Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Service, Inc., an employment agency published
over fifty advertisements with phrases such as: “recent college graduate,”
“excellent first job,” “1–2 years out of college,” “recent high school grad,”
“young executive,” “junior accountant,” “athletically inclined,” “career girls,”
and “young office group.” 73 The Department of Labor filed suit, arguing that the
use of these types of “trigger words” is a per se violation of Section 623(e). 74
The Fourth Circuit instead found that “that the discriminatory effect of an
advertisement is determined not by ‘trigger words’ but rather by its context.” 75
Advertisements did not need to explicitly state “younger workers only” or
restrict applicants to a certain age range to violate Section 623(e). On the other
hand, not every use of a trigger word established a discriminatory preference.
For example, the court found that the term “junior executive” simply described
the seniority level of the advertised position, rather than carrying connotations
of youth. 76 In contrast, using the terms “girls” or “career girls” was
discriminatory because it conveyed that the company was not interested in older
applicants. 77
In other cases, the expression of a discriminatory preference was quite
obvious from the text of the ads. For example, one company published an ad
seeking an accountant with the description: “[y]oung man with a college
degree.” 78 The court found it “hardly open to debate that the defendant violated
the unambiguous provisions of [Section 704(b)] by advertising for a male
accountant.” 79 In another case, companies recruiting on a college campus
checked a box indicating that they preferred to interview only male graduates,
and the court had no difficulty concluding those employers had “indicated an
express preference” to hire males. 80 The courts in these cases easily found that

72. Id.
73. 529 F.2d 760, 763, 765–66, 768 (4th Cir. 1975).
74. Id. at 765.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 767, n.14.
78. Banks v. Heun-Norwood, 566 F.2d 1073, 1074 (8th Cir. 1977). Although the court thought
that the employer had clearly violated 704(b), it refused to find liability on the grounds that plaintiff
was not “aggrieved,” an issue discussed further below.
79. Id. at 1076.
80. McDonald v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 24, 37 (E.D. Cal. 1974). The opinion does not
make clear which section of Title VII the plaintiff had alleged was violated, but the court’s analysis
of the job postings most easily fits with an allegation of liability under Section 704(b).
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the employers had expressed discriminatory preferences, but the availability of
relief turned on a second issue—whether the plaintiff could bring suit. 81
In addition to showing that an ad violates 704(b), plaintiffs must show that
they are “aggrieved” persons authorized to bring suit. 82 In Hailes, the court
easily found that posting a job for “stewardesses” in a “Help Wanted—Female”
column violated 704(b), but it also considered whether the male plaintiff could
sue. 83 The defendant, United Air Lines, argued that because Hailes never applied
for a position, he was not aggrieved. 84 The court rejected that argument, but also
declined to permit suit by “a mere casual reader.” 85 Instead, it held that a plaintiff
challenging a discriminatory ad must have “a real, present interest in the type of
employment advertised” and must show that the ad “effectively deterred” the
plaintiff from applying. 86 Other courts have followed this reasoning by the
Hailes court. 87
Requiring that private plaintiffs have a “real, present interest” in the
employment properly ensures that they have a genuine stake in the litigation.
They should be able to show that they are actively looking for work and would
plausibly have been interested in an advertised position. However, insisting that
they also prove that an ad “effectively deterred” them from applying is not
justified by either the text or the purpose of the statute. Sections 704(b) and
623(e) flatly forbid advertisements that “indicat[e] any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination” on a prohibited basis, with no additional
requirement of proving that the advertisement had any specific adverse effects. 88
These provisions differ in this respect from the general anti-discrimination
prohibitions found in Sections 703(a) and 623(a), which require some kind of
adverse employment action or effect on complainants’ job opportunities to
establish an unlawful employment practice. 89 Thus, as a textual matter, 704(b)

81. Banks, 566 F.2d at 1076; McDonald, 387 F. Supp. 24 at 34.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2012) (describing when and how an aggrieved person can
make a claim).
83. Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1008–09 (5th Cir. 1972).
84. Id. at 1008.
85. Id.
86. Id. In the Hailes case, the “effectively deterred” requirement posed no difficulty because
the plaintiff was able to demonstrate that he reasonably believed that applying to be a flight
attendant would be futile. By allowing Hailes to sue even though he had not applied, the court acted
consistently with cases holding that plaintiffs can pursue discriminatory failure-to-hire claims
without having actually applied when doing so would be a “futile gesture.” There is, however, a
difference between permitting a plaintiff to sue without having applied in a failure-to-hire case, and
requiring a plaintiff to prove that an advertisement has deterred her application in order to bring a
704(b) claim. For reasons explained in text, the latter requirement is unwarranted.
87. See, e.g., Banks v. Heun-Norwood, 566 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1977); McDonald v.
General Mills, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 24 (1974).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012).
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and 623(e) liability should turn solely on the nature of the employer’s
advertisements, not plaintiffs’ reactions to them.
Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that they were deterred from applying
may also undermine the purposes of those provisions, which is to forbid
employers from publicly expressing their discriminatory preferences. 90 If a job
seeker persists and applies for a job despite clearly discriminatory language, the
employer should not escape liability on the grounds that it did not successfully
deter the plaintiff’s application. The plaintiff should still be considered an
aggrieved party because the employer has expressly signaled that it devalues, if
not outright rejects, applicants like her for reasons that are unlawful. If the
employer rejects her application, she may also have a claim for discriminatory
failure to hire, but the 704(b) or 623(e) violation should be recognized as an
independent basis for liability.
B.

Advertising and Recruiting Practices as Evidence of Discrimination

Although only a handful of cases have analyzed the discriminatory
advertising provisions, courts also sometimes look at an employer’s advertising
and recruiting practices as evidence of discrimination under the general
prohibitions against employment discrimination found in Title VII and the
ADEA. 91 These provisions forbid adverse employment actions such as failure

90. Banks, 566 F.2d at 1074–79, illustrates how such a requirement can undermine
enforcement of 704(b). In that case, the employer escaped liability for publishing an advertisement
seeking a “young man” as an accountant, a clear statutory violation, because the court found that
the plaintiff had not been deterred by the ad. She had called to inquire about the position despite its
discriminatory language, and persisted even after the company confirmed that it was seeking a man.
It was only after the company made it clear that she would not be paid the salary she was seeking
that she gave up applying. Ironically, if the plaintiff had been less determined and had not inquired
about the job at all, she would have been considered “aggrieved” and could have pursued her 704(b)
claim.
The court appears to have conflated the plaintiff’s 704(b) claim with a claim of intentional
discrimination. It cited McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the case that laid out the framework for
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, even though that framework has no relevance in
a 704(b) case. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As Judge Bright
explained, “In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court provided guidelines for establishing
discriminatory conduct where the employer’s conduct is so subtle that the plaintiff cannot prove
discrimination directly. In the present case, the employer’s conduct is neither subtle nor indirect.
The employer here openly announced its interest in employing only males for the advertised
position.” Banks, 566 F.2d at 1079 (Bright, J. Statement on denial of petition for Rehearing En
Banc).
91. Title VII states that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
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to hire, or discharge, that are taken because of a protected characteristic, as well
as other practices that have the effect of depriving individuals of employment
opportunities on those bases. 92
Courts have generally recognized two routes for proving unlawful
discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact. 93 Disparate treatment
applies when an employer intended to discriminate on the basis of a protected
characteristic. 94 Disparate impact, on the other hand, does not require intent—
only that the employment policy or practice disproportionately affects a
protected group. 95 Distinct from the possibility of violating the discriminatory
preference provisions, an employer’s advertising and recruiting practices can
provide evidence supporting either a disparate treatment or disparate impact
theory of liability.
When plaintiffs allege disparate treatment, an employer’s advertisements
expressing a preference based on a protected characteristic may serve as relevant
evidence, strengthening the inference that it had a discriminatory motive when
it refused to hire or fired members of that group. For example, in Capaci v. Katz
& Besthoff, Inc., the EEOC alleged that a company failed to hire and promote
females at the same rate as males. 96 To support its claim of disparate treatment,
the EEOC argued that the company’s past advertising “indicated a preference
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). The ADEA contains nearly identical language:
It shall be unlawful for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s age . . .
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). This provision is also known as § 703(a). Title VII has
traditionally been interpreted as forbidding disparate treatment under § 703(a)(1). Kim, supra note
47, at 910–12. Disparate impact theory was originally recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), and has since been codified in § 704(k). In Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S.
228 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the disparate impact theory also applied in age
discrimination cases.
93. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 569 (1978); Charles A. Sullivan,
Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 914
(2005) (“Early in its history, the Supreme Court adopted two definitions of the term [discriminate]:
. . . . disparate impact . . . [and] disparate treatment . . . .”).
94. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487
U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988).
95. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2018).
96. 711 F.2d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 1983).
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for males in management openings and a preference for females in nonmanagement positions.” 97 The ads sought applications from “qualified young
men” for its management training positions, while seeking “counter girls” and
“salesladies” for non-management jobs. 98 In addition, the latter advertisements
were all placed in “Help Wanted-Female” newspaper columns, while ads for “a
manager trainee, ‘career in management,’ fountain manager trainee and
personnel director were found in the male columns.” 99 These ads undoubtedly
violated Section 704(b), but rather than pursue liability under that section, 100 the
EEOC argued that they provided evidence of the employer’s discriminatory
intent in hiring. 101 The Fifth Circuit agreed, finding the advertising evidence to
be “useful and probative” in establishing the employers’ “motivation and hiring
policies” and concluding that it showed an intent to discriminate based on sex. 102
Plaintiffs in ADEA cases have also attempted to use an employer’s allegedly
discriminatory ads as evidence of age discrimination. In Hodgson v. First
Federal, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) sought an injunction prohibiting an
employer from engaging in age discrimination in the future. 103 As part of its
evidence of discriminatory hiring, the DOL pointed to an advertisement the
defendant had placed in the newspaper seeking a “young man” for the position
of financial advertising assistant. 104 The court found that it was “substantive
evidence of a policy of age discrimination” which, combined with other
evidence in the case, justified the broad injunction sought by the DOL. 105
Similarly, in Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the court relied on an
employer’s job advertisement to find age discrimination. 106 The complainant,
who was fifty-seven, had been fired and the company placed an ad seeking
applicants between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six for the position shortly

97. Id. at 658–659.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 659.
100. It appears that by the time of the litigation, the company had ceased its discriminatory
advertising practices and so there was no need for the EEOC to pursue injunctive relief to prevent
further violations.
101. Capaci, 711 F.2d at 658.
102. Id. at 660, 666.
103. Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 455 F.2d 818, 820–21 (5th Cir. 1972).
104. Hodgson, 455 F.2d at 825–26.
105. Id. at 826–27. The district court originally issued an injunction prohibiting age
discrimination in hiring bank tellers. Id. at 821. After reviewing advertisements that indicated age
discrimination across a variety of positions, the Fifth Circuit held that the injunction needed to be
broadened to include all jobs. Id. at 826–27. See also DeBuhr v. Olds Prod. Co., No. 95 C 1462,
1996 WL 277644 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 1996) (finding that though the “advertisement does not alone
directly support a claim for intentional discrimination, viewing [it] in light of the other statements
made by [the president] it adds to the circumstantial evidence from which discriminatory intent
might be inferred.”).
106. 554 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1977).
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afterward. 107 The court inferred from this evidence that the decision to discharge
complainant “was tainted by the impermissible criterion of age.” 108
Arguments that an employer’s advertising practices are proof of intentional
discrimination are not always successful. Rather, their impact depends upon the
language and context of the ads, as well as other circumstances surrounding the
allegedly discriminatory actions. For example, merely using the pronoun “his”
in a job advertisement does not create an inference of sex discrimination. 109
Similarly, encouraging applications from degree candidates does not necessarily
mean an employer is engaged in age discrimination. 110 In another case, the court
found that the use of phrases such as “young bankers,” “fresh new ideas and
outlook,” and “new talent” in connection with a college recruiting program did
not provide proof that “age discrimination was the standard operating
procedure” in the employer’s dealings with existing employees of the companies
it had acquired. 111 Thus, depending upon the circumstances, an employer’s
advertising can support an inference that an employer has acted for
discriminatory reasons.
Courts have also found that employers’ recruitment practices can give rise
to disparate impact liability. 112 In a case from the Sixth Circuit, United States v.
City of Warren, the Department of Justice filed suit against a municipality that
did not have a single black employee out of a workforce of 1,500. 113 The City
of Warren was located in Macomb County, which was overwhelmingly white,
and immediately adjacent to Detroit, which had a majority black population. 114
Warren advertised its municipal employment opportunities in three newspapers
with circulations in the County and in none of the newspapers with significant
circulation in Detroit. 115 There was no allegation that the ads themselves
expressed a discriminatory preference in violation of Section 704(b). However,
the employer’s recruiting practices as a whole were challenged as racially
discriminatory. 116 The Sixth Circuit agreed, finding that by publishing job
notices only in outlets where black applicants were extremely unlikely to see
107. Id.
108. Id. at 735.
109. Wallette v. Thompson, 373 F. Supp.2d 986, 992 (D.N.D. 2005).
110. Boyd v. City of Wilmington, 943 F. Supp. 585, 591 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (finding that word
“candidates” is not listed in the EEOC regulation as one of the “trigger words,” does not carry
“connotations of youth” as discussed in Hodgson, and does not indicate a preference for young
applicants because it is merely part of the description of educational qualifications needed for the
position).
111. Stone v. First Union Corp., 203 F.R.D. 532, 549 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
112. United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083 (6th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Brennan, 650 F.3d
65 (2d Cir. 2011).
113. City of Warren, 138 F.3d at 1094.
114. Id. at 1088.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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them, the City had created an effective barrier to black employment. 117 The court
concluded that Warren’s “limitation of its applicant pool to residents of the
overwhelmingly white city, combined with its refusal to publicize jobs outside
the racially homogeneous county,” had a disparate impact on black workers in
violation of Title VII. 118
Word-of-mouth and other informal recruiting practices may also give rise to
liability for disparate impact discrimination. 119 For example, in Thomas v.
Washington County School Board, a black teacher sued alleging race
discrimination in hiring when it failed to notify her of job openings after she had
expressed interest in a teaching position. 120 The Board generally did not
advertise teaching vacancies, but posted notices of available openings in its
school buildings. 121 Applicants therefore learned of opportunities primarily
through word-of-mouth and were often relatives of current school employees.
Because the plaintiff had not been aware of new job openings, she had been
unable to apply. 122 The plaintiff also produced evidence of at least forty-six
cases of nepotism and the testimony of other black applicants who had been
unable to apply because they were unaware of job openings. 123 The court found
that “nepotism and word-of-mouth hiring . . . in the context of a predominantly
white work force, serve[s] to freeze the effects of past discrimination.” 124
Although the court did not find evidence of intentional discrimination, it
permitted the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim because the board’s recruiting

117. Id. at 1094.
118. City of Warren, 138 F.3d at 1094. At trial, the United States offered evidence comparing
Warren’s applicant pools for police and firefighter positions before and after its advertising
practices changed. Id. at 1092–93. When the city limited its advertisements to Warren and Macomb
County in 1985 and 1986, zero of the 182 applications for firefighter positions, and one of the 400
applications for police officers were from black applicants. Id. at 1089. When the city advertised in
Detroit newspapers in 1987, it “attracted 50 black applicants (6.2% of the total).” United States v.
City of Warren, No. 86-CV-75435-DT, 1992 WL 509994, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 1992), rev’d
in part, 138 F.3d 1083 (6th Cir. 1998).
119. See, e.g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 271 (10th Cir. 1975) (utilizing an
employee referral system for hiring is an unlawful employment practice under Title VII where (1)
an employer relies primarily or exclusively on such a method and (2) because of a history of past
discrimination, the almost all white work force tends to perpetuate itself); E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone
Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002) (company had a practice of only hiring male
waiters and it relied on an employee referral system that reinforced this discrimination); United
States v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., CIV. A. No. H–83–5107, 1987 WL 9919, at *27 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 18, 1987) (word-of-mouth recruitment and refusal to attend the historically black college’s
career fair was evidence of intentional discrimination); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543,
547 (4th Cir. 1975); Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970).
120. Thomas v. Washington Cty. Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 923–24 (4th Cir. 1990).
121. Id. at 924–25.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 925.
124. Id.
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practices “may discriminate against minorities as effectively as an intentionally
discriminatory policy.” 125
*****
In the offline world before social media and targeted advertising,
discriminatory recruitment practices could give rise to employer liability under
the advertising provisions of Title VII and the ADEA, or under those statutes’
more general provisions prohibiting unlawful adverse actions such as failure to
hire or discharge. Liability under the discriminatory advertising provisions
turned on proof that an advertisement or job posting expressed an unlawful
preference—a determination made by looking not only at the words used in an
ad, but also its entire context. Employers were also sometimes held liable for
unlawful failure to hire or discharge when their recruiting practices either served
as evidence of discriminatory intent, or were neutral in content, but had the effect
of discriminating against protected workers.
IV. ASSESSING LIABILITY FOR ONLINE TARGETED RECRUITMENT
While the old help-wanted ads in newspapers could potentially have been
seen by anyone, platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are desirable fora for
employers to advertise precisely because they can target specific audiences. 126
Employers do not need to pay for ads served to a mass audience, but only to the
most relevant and desirable groups of users. 127 This “microtargeting” winnows
audiences down by excluding those outside the targeted group from seeing the
ads at all. As discussed in Part II, sometimes that microtargeting can have the
effect of excluding already disadvantaged groups along the lines of race, sex,
age and other protected characteristics—an effect we referred to as classification
bias. 128 In this Part we consider the extent to which existing anti-discrimination
law can reach such recruiting practices. We first evaluate whether the provisions
in Title VII and the ADEA forbidding discriminatory advertising might apply.
We next consider whether these practices might give rise to liability under
traditional disparate treatment and disparate impact theories.

125. Thomas, 915 F.2d at 925–26.
126. Angwin et al., supra note 1 (stating that “[t]he ability of advertisers to deliver their
message to the precise audience most likely to respond is the cornerstone of Facebook’s business
model.”).
127. See Angwin et al., supra note 1. The article details that it is “[t]he precision of Facebook’s
ad delivery [that] has helped it dominate an industry once in the hands of print and broadcast outlets.
The system, called microtargeting, allows advertisers to reach essentially whomever they prefer,
including the people their analysis suggests are the most plausible hires or consumers, lowering the
costs and vastly increasing efficiency.”
128. See infra Part II.
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Expressing Discriminatory Preferences Through Targeted Advertising

Recall that there are three distinct ways in which employers’ online
recruitment practices might cause discriminatory effects. The first method
involves using protected characteristics like sex or age to define the target
audience. As discussed above, whether a notice expresses a discriminatory
preference depends not just on its text or the use of certain words, but the overall
context in which it appears. The recruitment ads that appear in someone’s
newsfeed are unlikely to include text or images that directly express a preference
based on race, sex or age, but the context in which an ad is distributed may do
so instead. For example, in the Bradley case, the plaintiffs collected numerous
examples of job postings on Facebook in which the contents of the ads were
neutral, and yet, the ads were deliberately targeted in a way that excluded older
workers. 129 This age-based targeting was not visible from the ad itself. However,
in the examples appended to the Bradley complaint, users who clicked on the
“Why Am I Seeing This?” link 130 learned that the ad was targeted to persons in
a particular age range, such as eighteen to thirty-five. 131
A strong argument can be made that ads like these—which expressly rely
on age to target a younger audience—are “indicating” a “limitation” or
“specification” based on age in violation of Section 623(e). Similarly, if an
employer sponsors career ads that are expressly targeted at only men or only
women, it has indicated a preference that violates Section 704(b). 132 Just like the
sex-segregated newspaper columns in the 1970s, the criteria defining the target
audience online should be part of the context relevant for determining the
meaning of an advertisement today. And where an employer targets a group
defined along the lines of race, sex, age, et cetera, it has clearly violated the
prohibitions on discriminatory advertising.
As discussed in Part II above, there are two additional ways that targeted
advertising can have discriminatory effects: using neutral attributes that act as
proxies for protected characteristics and relying on a biased source audience to
build a “lookalike audience.” 133 It will be more difficult to prove that an

129. Bradley v. T-Mobile, No. 5:17-cv-07232, 2017 WL 6539268, para. 2–3 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
1, 2018).
130. The “Why am I seeing this?” feature was developed by Facebook in 2014 to address user
concerns about how the platform targeted them based on their behaviors. The button is at the top
of all advertisements. See Kozlowska, supra note 18; Todd Wasserman, Facebook Will Now Tell
You Why You’re Seeing Those Ads, MASHABLE (June 12, 2014), https://mashable.com/2014/06/12/
facebook-explains-ads/#u2VFN4UBEmqC [https://perma.cc/YM6G-9HSG].
131. Bradley, 2017 WL 6539268, para. 2–3. The explanations given by Facebook typically do
not explain all of the bases on which users are targeted. Thus, the targeting process is not entirely
transparent and it is possible that discriminatory bases are not always revealed. See Kozlowska,
supra note 18.
132. Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 659 (5th Cir. 1983).
133. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 11.
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employer using either of these methods has violated the provisions prohibiting
discriminatory advertising. There may be situations where a neutral attribute is
so closely and obviously connected with a protected characteristic that relying
on it may inherently express a discriminatory preference—for example,
excluding users interested in BlackNews.com or Nuestro Diario. 134 Similarly, if
the employer provides a source audience that was itself defined in a
discriminatory way—for example, its current employees under the age of
forty—then using the lookalike audience tool might indicate an unlawful
preference. In many other situations, however, the connection between the
choice of attributes or a source audience and any discriminatory effects will be
far more subtle, making it difficult to argue that the resulting advertising
indicates a discriminatory preference.
Assuming that an ad does express an unlawful preference, the second step
in the analysis requires identifying who is entitled to bring a Section 704(b) or
Section 623(e) claim. There may be a practical problem at the outset because the
people most likely to be aggrieved are highly unlikely to learn about the
discriminatory ads. Unlike sex-segregated columns which were plainly visible
to anyone reading the newspaper, targeted advertising works by making ads
visible only to the included group. 135 Those who are not in the included group
simply will not see the ad. They will have no opportunity to ask “Why Am I Not
Seeing This Ad?” or to learn about the discriminatory targeting criteria.
If users in the excluded group somehow become aware that they are not
being shown ads, they can sue if they are “aggrieved” under the relevant statute.
An individual who is actively seeking work and uses social media should be able
to easily demonstrate a “real, present interest” in learning about job
opportunities. As we have argued above, such a showing should be sufficient to
authorize a plaintiff to enforce the prohibitions on discriminatory advertising.
Even if courts impose an additional requirement that plaintiffs show they
were “effectively deterred” by an ad, excluded users will often be able to satisfy
it. Not informing people of a job opportunity is a highly effective barrier. If
potential applicants are excluded from receiving a recruitment ad, it follows that
the discriminatory nature of the ad—namely its targeting criteria—deterred them
from applying. Users who were deliberately excluded from receiving a job
posting and failed to apply should therefore be considered aggrieved parties
entitled to sue under Section 704(b) or Section 623(e).
A more difficult question is raised if a potential applicant, excluded from
receiving targeted advertising, learns about the job through other means and
applies. If she is required to show that she was effectively deterred, the fact that
she applied may foreclose a discriminatory advertising claim, even if the
employer has deliberately excluded users like her from receiving the ad on a
134. Id. at 9.
135. Id. at 1–2.
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discriminatory basis. The employer might argue that because it used a variety of
media to reach potential applicants, the fact that this particular plaintiff learned
of the job opportunity means that she is not an aggrieved party. Such a result
would be troubling, because even if that individual learned of the opportunity,
members of the excluded group overall will be far less likely to become aware
of it. The person who is in the best position to challenge the exclusionary
advertising should not be precluded from doing so because she chose to apply
anyway. Given the increasing significance of social media in the recruitment and
hiring process, plaintiffs should be permitted to enforce the discriminatory
advertising prohibitions so long as they have a genuine interest in the type of
employment being advertised.
Regardless of whether “effective deterrence” must be proven to bring a
discriminatory advertising claim, a plaintiff who applies and is rejected may be
able to pursue a discriminatory failure to hire claim. That possibility is discussed
in the next section.
B.

Targeted Recruitment and Liability for Disparate Treatment or Disparate
Impact

The discriminatory advertising provisions in Title VII and the ADEA
directly forbid unlawful ads, but, as seen in Part III above, employers’
advertising practices in the offline world have also been held to support claims
of disparate treatment and disparate impact. Similar arguments can be made in
the online world. Rejected job seekers may be able to point to an employer’s
targeting strategy to show either that the employer intended to discriminate, or
that its neutral advertising practices were in fact unlawfully screening out
potential applicants along the lines of race, sex or other protected characteristics.
Disparate treatment cases turn on employer intent, and therefore whether an
employer’s online targeting strategy supports a finding of liability depends upon
how clearly it indicates a discriminatory preference. If the employer expressly
excludes some social media users from its target audience because of their
protected characteristics, those choices strongly suggest that it intends to
discourage members of those groups from applying. For example, if an employer
directs its advertising only at men, or only at persons aged eighteen to thirtyfive, a court may infer that a female or older applicant was rejected because of
the employer’s discriminatory motive. Less explicit strategies, such as selecting
an audience using neutral attributes or relying on the lookalike audience tool,
may not clearly indicate a discriminatory preference, making it more difficult to
infer motive from these choices.
Determining whether employer advertising provides evidence of intent in a
disparate treatment case should closely parallel the analysis of whether the
advertising is unlawful under Section 704(b) or Section 623(e). If the language
of an ad and the context in which it is delivered indicate a “preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination” on a forbidden basis, then that advertisement
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should also provide evidence of discriminatory motive. Conversely, ads that are
not deemed unlawful under the advertising provisions should not be taken as
proof of an employer’s intent. Although these questions—whether an
advertisement expresses a discriminatory preference and whether it evidences a
discriminatory motive—are parallel, disparate treatment liability will require
additional proof. Publication of a discriminatory ad itself constitutes a violation
under Section 704(b) and Section 623(e); however, disparate treatment liability
also requires the plaintiff to show that she suffered an adverse employment
action and that the decision was made on a discriminatory basis.
When discriminatory effects result from targeting choices that rely on
neutral attributes or the lookalike tool, it is less clear that those choices reflect a
discriminatory motive. Without some evidence that the employer wanted to
produce those effects, the observed bias may have occurred unintentionally. In
such a situation, a disparate impact challenge would be more appropriate.
In many ways, discriminatory online targeting fits well with past disparate
impact cases. In City of Warren, discussed above, the court found that the City
of Warren’s failure to publicize job openings outside all-white Macomb County
gave rise to disparate impact liability. 136 By not publishing ads in newspapers
with circulations in Detroit, which is located immediately adjacent, the City of
Warren “produced a de factor barrier” for black applicants. 137 Today, if an
employer used the “location” screening feature on Facebook to direct its ads
only at residents with zip codes in an overwhelmingly white county, 138 the effect
would be identical. Just as the court in City of Warren held that facially neutral
advertising can violate Title VII, so too, courts today should find a disparate
impact when employers target their recruitment ads using neutral attributes that
disproportionately exclude users along the lines of race or other protected bases.
In a similar fashion, the word-of-mouth recruitment cases suggest that when
the lookalike audience tool has discriminatory effects, an employer may be liable
for disparate impact. The word-of-mouth cases recognize that when a workforce
is overwhelmingly white, reliance on informal methods of publicizing job
opportunities will exclude nonwhites from applying for those positions,
effectively discriminating against them. 139 The lookalike audience feature is
closely analogous to word-of-mouth recruiting. If an employer uses its current
workforce, or some other set of people, as a source audience, and that set
excludes certain demographic groups, the resulting lookalike audience is likely
to similarly exclude those groups from receiving notice of job opportunities.

136. City of Warren, 138 F.3d at 1094.
137. Id.
138. Reach People in the Areas Where You Do Business, FACEBOOK BUSINESS,
https://www.facebook.com/business/a/location-targeting [https://perma.cc/A53S-RQ4B] (last
visited Nov. 8, 2018).
139. See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Cty. Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 925 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Even though reliance on the lookalike tool may appear neutral, it may work “as
effectively as any intentionally discriminatory policy” 140 to perpetuate bias. Just
as in the word-of-mouth cases, such an effect should be sufficient to show
disparate impact.
Of course, there will be complications and difficulties of proof in pursuing
a disparate impact theory. For example, proof of a disproportionate impact has
typically turned on statistical evidence of a disparity using workflow data. In a
world in which employers micro-target their recruitment efforts and seek to
identify “passive applicants,” disputes will arise about how to identify the
relevant population against which any disproportionate impact should be
measured. Employers will also argue that their targeted recruiting practices are
justified. The responses of some employers to the allegations in the Bradley
complaint are illustrative. 141 One employer argued that age-based targeting was
justified because it was the most cost-effective way of reaching individuals who
were most likely to submit an application. 142 Another argued that its age-targeted
Facebook ads were “part of a broader recruitment strategy” and that it
“advertises across many mediums” and hires on a nondiscriminatory basis. 143
Thus, employers will likely defend their practices on the grounds that their
overall recruitment efforts, of which social media ads are only one part, do not
discriminate against or hinder opportunities for anyone.
Many questions remain to be worked out, such as what kind of statistical
evidence will suffice to trigger scrutiny of an employer’s recruitment practices
and what reasons are sufficient to justify those practices when they are
systematically biased against disadvantaged groups. However, in answering
those questions, courts should not mechanically apply the details of disparate
impact doctrine as it has developed to meet other types of employer practices.
As one of us has argued elsewhere, classification bias that results from datadriven employment processes is not the same as the written ability tests or
seniority systems that initially gave rise to the disparate impact doctrine. 144 As
a result, the doctrinal superstructure that has grown up around disparate impact
theory does not quite fit the challenges posed by new technologies for sorting

140. Id.
141. Jeff Larson et al., These Are the Job Ads You Can’t See on Facebook If You’re Older,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2017), http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/facebook-job-ads [https://per
ma.cc/JHX8-EEDS].
142. A spokesperson for Goldman Sachs defended limiting distribution of its ads about entry
level positions to people eighteen to sixty-four because those sixty-five and older are more likely
to click on ads but are very unlikely to apply. That pattern makes the ads more costly without
increasing the yield of applicants. Angwin et al., supra note 1.
143. Statement by UPS. See Larson et al., supra note 143.
144. See, Kim, supra note 47, at 907–09. See also Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact
Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 716 (2006).
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and screening workers. 145 The theory of disparate impact certainly applies—
namely the idea that some practices that are neutral on their face can nevertheless
have discriminatory effects. Where those practices constitute arbitrary barriers
to job opportunities for disadvantaged groups, they ought to be forbidden. The
details of how that theory ought to be applied to specific situations, however,
needs to be adjusted given that practices like targeted online advertising are quite
different from the context in which disparate impact doctrine first developed.
As explained in earlier work, there is ample room in Title VII’s text for
developing an effective response to new forms of discrimination. 146 In 1991,
Congress codified disparate impact doctrine in Section 703(k) of the statute, but
it left intact the language of Section 703(a)(2), which makes it unlawful for an
employer to “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants . . . in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities” because of race, sex or other protected characteristic. 147 New
technologies like targeted online recruitment operate precisely by classifying
applicants in ways that “tend to deprive” some of them of employment
opportunities, and when those classifications coincide with protected class lines
they run afoul of the prohibition in Section 703(a)(2). While existing disparate
impact doctrine is captured in Section 703(k), the prohibitions in Section
703(a)(2) arguably continue to have independent force, 148 providing room for
the development of doctrine that can more closely respond to the challenges
posed by technologically-driven forms of exclusion, such as those that can occur
with targeted online recruitment.
V. CONCLUSION
The ability to precisely target which types of people will receive
employment ads online is transforming how companies recruit new employees.
By leveraging the vast amounts of data available about social media users,
employers can reach a broader range of qualified candidates more efficiently.
However, relying on extensive personal data to target the recipients of online
job ads also risks sorting people in ways that exclude already disadvantaged
groups from receiving critical information about job opportunities. The legal
issues raised by online recruiting are not entirely novel. Existing antidiscrimination law offers some tools for addressing the more blatant forms of
discriminatory advertising. However, online recruiting is not the same as the old
help-wanted ads in the newspapers, and so, if the law is to effectively combat
systematic disadvantage and inequality in a data-driven world, it will have to
evolve as well.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Kim, supra note 47, at 860.
Id. at 909–16.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
Kim, supra note 47, at 915.

